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# Lecture 12: ROP & Review

January 27, 2020

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**Lab 3 (Bomb) Due 1:15pm Tomorrow**

**Lab 4 (Attack) Starts Tomorrow — New Partner!**

**Take-Home Midterm available by 5pm Tomorrow Afternoon  
(75-minute exam due 5pm next Friday)**



# *Security: The Story So Far*

# Observation

Rest of stack frame for <code>call_echo</code>							
00	00	00	00	00	40	00	34
33	32	31	30	39	38	37	36
35	34	33	32	31	30	39	38
37	36	35	34	33	32	31	30

```
unix> ./bufdemo-nsp
Type a string:0123456789012345678901234
Segmentation Fault
```


The program crashed because the code "returned" (jumped) to address `0x400034`, which didn't contain valid machine code.

*And by typing in a carefully-chosen 32-character string, we can make `echo()` "return" (jump) to any address we want!*

# Code Injection Attacks


Input string includes bytes encoding machine code

Overwrite return address A with address of that code!



## 2. System-Level Protections can help

- Non-executable code segments
  - In previous x86, could mark region of memory as either “read-only” or “writeable”... could execute anything readable
  - X86-64 added explicit “execute” permission
  - Stack marked as non-executable



Any attempt to execute this code will fail

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# Are We Still in Danger?

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If the stack is marked "don't execute"

- we can't write machine code into the buffer and jump to it.
- but we can still overwrite the return address
- we can force a "return" (jump!) anywhere in the code that is running.

Is that really so bad?

Yes!

# Question 1

There are *lots* of instructions in a typical program.



Suppose that at address `0x410000` there are two consecutive instructions

`inc %ebp`  
`retq`

Suppose we overwrite the return address with `0x410000`.

What happens when function Q returns?

`0x45`  
`0xc3`



## Question 2

There are *lots* of instructions in a typical program.


Suppose that at address `0x410000` there are two consecutive instructions

`0x45 incl %ebp`

`0xc3 retq`

Suppose we overwrite the return address with three copies of `0x410000`

What happens when function Q returns?





# Return-Oriented Programming (ROP)

Idea:

- Find *existing* machine code instructions followed by `retq`  
(These are called *gadgets*)
- Put a sequence of *gadgets* addresses on the stack.  
(where the sequence of *gadgets* does our evil work)

The computer returns (jumps) from each *gadget* to the next!

- It reads addresses from the stack, but executes code in the text segment.


But most of our `retq` instructions immediately follow `addq $..., %rsp`.

- Can attacker find enough *gadgets* to do evil?

**Yes!**

# We don't need `retq`; we need `0xc3`!

## Unintended instructions — `ecb_crypt()`





Have Fun with Lab 4!

# Review Topics

- Bits
- And/Or/Not/Xor
- Arithmetic & logical shifts
- Integers
  - Unsigned ints
  - 2's complement
  - Max/min values
- Negating a signed int
- Signed/unsigned compare
- Zero- vs. sign-extension
- Casting
- Overflow
- Mult/Div vs. Shifting
- IEEE float & double
- Normal, special, and denormal fp numbers
- Memory vs. registers
- Machine code vs. assembly
- x86 assembly
  - arithmetic
  - movq vs. leaq
  - comparisons
  - condition codes
  - conditional jumps
  - conditional moves
- Implementing if, do, while loops using jumps & labels
- Stack frames & %rsp
- Return address
- Arrays, Structs, Unions
  - Padding/alignment
- Buffer overflows
  - Identifying
  - Security implications
  - Prevention techniques



sign  
= +  
= -

$$1.\text{mantissa} \times 2^{\text{expt} - \text{bias}}$$

$$\pm \frac{1.\text{---}}{2} \times 2^{+127}$$

$$\pm \frac{1.\text{---}}{2} \times \text{though } 2^{-126}$$

normals

if expt is all 0's then

$$\pm 0.\text{---}_{\text{mantissa}} \times 2^{-126}$$

denormals

if expt is all 1's then

+∞, -∞, or NaN, depending on mantissa bits.

special

if  $x \geq 0$  then  $-x \leq 0$  ✓

- For 8 bit signed

$$\underline{-128} \leq x \leq \underline{127}$$

if  $x \leq 0$  then  $-x \geq 0$  ✗

$$-(-128) \neq -128$$

n bits

unsigned

$$U_{\max} = 2^n - 1$$

⋮


$$U_{\min} = 0$$

signed

$$T_{\max} = 2^{n-1} - 1$$

⋮

$$T_{\min} = -2^{n-1}$$




caller-save registers - functions are allowed to use these w/o putting them back

callee-save registers - the way they functions must put the original values back before they return.



# Floats



Single-Precision 32 bit total

Double 64 bits

sign  
0 = +  
1 = -

Normals:

$$\pm 1. \text{ "mantissa" } \times 2^{\text{"expt" - "bias"}}$$

Denormals

$$\pm 0. \text{ "mantissa" } \times 2^{1 - \text{"bias"}}$$

if "expt" = 0000000...

$$\begin{aligned} & \left[ \begin{array}{l} \text{Single} \\ \pm 1. \text{ --- } \times 2^{127} \\ \updownarrow \\ \pm 1. \text{ --- } \times 2^{-126} \\ \pm 0. \text{ --- } \times 2^{-126} \end{array} \right] \end{aligned}$$

Special

(if "expt" = 1111...1)

$+\infty, -\infty, \text{NaN}$  depending on "mantissa" bit patterns

# Structs & alignment

```
struct {  
  char c;  
  int i;  
};
```



↑  
nice  
multiple  
of 4/8/16/etc

```
struct  
  char c;  
  int i;  
  char d;  
};
```



Goal: 4 byte primitive data  
should live/start at an address  
that is a multiple of 4

8-byte primitive data ...

Fact: structs will be placed  
so they start at a nice address  
(multiple of 4, 8, 16, ...)

```
struct {  
  char c;  
  char d;  
  int i;  
};
```



