

Typed λ -Calculus and Logic

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CS 131: Programming Languages

One-step β -Reduction

- The relation \rightarrow_β is defined by:

$$\frac{}{(\lambda x:t.M)N \rightarrow_\beta M[x \rightarrow N]}$$

$$\frac{M \rightarrow_\beta M'}{M N \rightarrow_\beta M' N} \quad \frac{N \rightarrow_\beta N'}{M N \rightarrow_\beta M N'}$$

$$\frac{M \rightarrow_\beta M'}{\lambda x:t.M \rightarrow_\beta \lambda x:t.M'}$$

Pure Simply-Typed λ -Calculus

- Syntax

$$M, N ::= x \quad \text{variables}$$

$$| \lambda x:t.M \quad \text{functions}$$

$$| M N \quad \text{applications}$$

$$t, u ::= \alpha_1 \mid \alpha_2 \mid \dots \quad \text{type variables}$$

$$| t \rightarrow u \quad \text{function types}$$

Extension: Adding Pairs

- Syntax as in NQSM

$$M, N ::= \dots$$

$$| \langle M, N \rangle \quad \text{pairs}$$

$$| \text{fst } M \mid \text{snd } M \quad \text{projections}$$

$$t, u ::= \dots$$

$$| t * u \quad \text{pair types}$$

$$\frac{}{\text{fst } \langle M, N \rangle \rightarrow M} \quad \frac{}{\text{snd } \langle M, N \rangle \rightarrow N}$$

Summary: Static Semantics

$$\frac{}{\dots, x:t, \dots \vdash x : t}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, x:t \vdash M : u}{\Gamma \vdash (\lambda x:t.M) : t \rightarrow u} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : t \rightarrow u \quad \Gamma \vdash N : t}{\Gamma \vdash M N : u}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : t \quad \Gamma \vdash N : u}{\Gamma \vdash \langle M, N \rangle : t * u}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : t * u}{\Gamma \vdash \text{fst } M : t} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash M : t * u}{\Gamma \vdash \text{snd } M : u}$$

Erasing All but the Types

$$\frac{}{\dots, t, \dots \vdash t}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, t \vdash u}{\Gamma \vdash t \rightarrow u} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t \rightarrow u \quad \Gamma \vdash t}{\Gamma \vdash u}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t \quad \Gamma \vdash u}{\Gamma \vdash t * u}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t * u}{\Gamma \vdash t} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t * u}{\Gamma \vdash u}$$

Rules for Propositional Logic

$$\frac{}{\dots, p, \dots \vdash p}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, p \vdash q}{\Gamma \vdash p \Rightarrow q} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p \Rightarrow q \quad \Gamma \vdash p}{\Gamma \vdash q}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p \quad \Gamma \vdash q}{\Gamma \vdash p \wedge q}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash p \wedge q}{\Gamma \vdash p} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash p \wedge q}{\Gamma \vdash q}$$

Curry-Howard Isomorphism

- a.k.a. "Proofs as programs", "Propositions as types"
- Every type corresponds to a logical proposition
 - Type variables correspond to propositional variables
 - Function types correspond to implications
 - Pair types correspond to conjunctions
- A proposition is provable if and only if there is a term of the corresponding type
 - Such types are said to be *inhabited*.
 - Typed λ -terms are encodings of proofs.

Examples

1. Show that

$$\vdash p \Rightarrow (p \wedge p)$$

by finding a term of type

$$\alpha \rightarrow (\alpha * \alpha)$$

2. Show that

$$\vdash (p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)) \Rightarrow ((p \wedge q) \Rightarrow r)$$

by finding a term of type

$$(\alpha \rightarrow (\beta \rightarrow \gamma)) \rightarrow ((\alpha * \beta) \rightarrow \gamma)$$

Extensions

- The `true` proposition corresponds to any non-empty type
 - E.g., `unit`.
- The `false` proposition corresponds to an empty type.
 - Usually called `void`.
 - Encode $\neg p$ as $(p \Rightarrow \text{false})$.
- Second-order predicate calculus: polymorphic types
 - Second-order = quantifying over *propositions*.
 - E.g., $\forall \alpha. \alpha \rightarrow (\alpha * \alpha)$ vs. $\forall p. p \rightarrow (p \wedge p)$
- Disjunctions: sum types
- Propositional logic: dependent types
- Modal logic: run-time code generation
- Linear logic: linear types

Intuitionism

- Generally, λ -calculi correspond to *constructive* or *intuitionistic* logics.

- E.g., no terms of type

$$\forall \alpha. \alpha + (\alpha \rightarrow \text{void}) \quad (\forall p. p \text{ or } \neg p)$$

$$\forall \alpha. ((\alpha \rightarrow \text{void}) \rightarrow \text{void}) \rightarrow \alpha \quad (\forall p. \neg \neg p \Rightarrow p)$$

$$\forall \alpha. \forall \beta. ((\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow \alpha \quad (\text{Pierce's Law})$$

Proof Normalization

- Reductions as proof "simplifications".

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash M : t \quad \Gamma \vdash N : u}{\Gamma \vdash \langle M, N \rangle : t * u}$$

$$\Gamma \vdash \text{fst } \langle M, N \rangle : t$$

$$\Gamma \vdash M : t$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t \quad \Gamma \vdash u}{\Gamma \vdash t \wedge u}$$

$$\Gamma \vdash t$$

$$\Gamma \vdash t$$

Hilbert System for Implication

Axiom Schema

$$\frac{p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow p)}{(p \Rightarrow (q \Rightarrow r)) \Rightarrow ((p \Rightarrow q) \Rightarrow (p \Rightarrow r))}$$

Modus Ponens

$$\frac{p \Rightarrow q \quad p}{q}$$

Summary

λ -Calculus

Logic

Type



Proposition

Term (program)



Proof

Reduction



Proof Normalization

Logical Frameworks

- A *deductive system* is a specification containing axioms and rules of inference.
 - Examples:
 - Logics
 - Mathematical theories
 - Syntax definitions
 - Typing rules
 - Dynamic semantics
- A *logical framework* is a language for formally specifying deductive systems.

Automath

- 1960's-70's: de Bruijn creates Automath system(s) for formalizing mathematics
 - Goals:
 - Mechanical checking of mathematical proofs
 - Simple, very general framework
 - Not committed to any specific mathematical theory
 - Proof-checking easy because all steps are small.
 - Ph.D. student translated and mechanically checked an entire text on foundations of real analysis.
 - Development of the properties of real and complex numbers starting from the Peano axioms.

LF

- The particular logical framework I will concentrate on today
 - Based upon (dependently-typed) λ -calculus
 - So we can use β -conversion whenever we want
 - Implemented by a system called Elf

Example: Predicate Logic

```
o : type. % type of propositions
i : type. % type of individuals

true  : o.
false : o.
and   : o -> o -> o.
or    : o -> o -> o.
imp   : o -> o -> o.
not   : o -> o.

zero  : i.
succ  : i -> i.
even  : i -> o.
```

```
⌈ (¬true) ⇒ (even(successor(0))) ⌋ =
imp (not true) (even (succ zero)) : o
```

Representing Object Languages

- The axioms and rules of inference are about things in some domain
 - e.g., logical propositions, program expressions, types, etc.
 - The domain of whatever problem we care about is called the *object language*.
- To formalize a deductive system we need to first describe the object language.

What About Variables?

- What about free or bound variables in the object language?
 - e.g., quantifiers, function parameters, etc.
- Two main methods
 - Use constants for variables (e.g., strings)
 - Use logical-framework variables and functions
 - Known as HOAS (Higher-Order Abstract Syntax)

What About Variables?

- Representing variables as constants:

```

 $\ulcorner \forall x.((\text{even } x) \vee (\text{even}(\text{successor}(x)))) \urcorner =$ 
forall "x" (or (even "x") (even (succ "x")))
    
```

- Advantages:
 - Simple
 - Works better with certain inductive proofs
- Disadvantages:
 - Must also formalize checking for unbound variables, renaming of bound variables, substitution, etc.

Representing Proofs

- Now that we can represent propositions, we would like to be able to formalize the proof rules.
- We can do this by setting up
 - a type of *proofs*
 - a representation of proof trees.

What About Variables?

- Representing variables as variables:

```

forall : (i -> o) -> o
exists : (i -> o) -> o
    
```

```

 $\ulcorner \forall x.((\text{even } x) \vee (\text{even}(\text{successor}(x)))) \urcorner =$ 
forall ( $\lambda x:i.(\text{or } (\text{even } x) (\text{even } (\text{succ } x)))$ ) : o
    
```

- Advantages
 - Typechecking ensures all variables are bound
 - Can get substitution from function application

Natural Deduction (First Try)

$\frac{}{\text{true}}$	$\frac{p \quad q}{p \wedge q}$	$\frac{p \wedge q}{p}$	$\frac{p \wedge q}{q}$
------------------------	--------------------------------	------------------------	------------------------

```

nd : type
truei : nd
andi  : nd -> nd -> nd
andel : nd -> nd
ander : nd -> nd
    
```

$\frac{}{\text{true}}$	$\frac{}{\text{true}}$
$\frac{\text{true} \quad \text{true}}{\text{true} \wedge \text{true}}$	
$\frac{\text{true} \wedge \text{true}}{\text{true}}$	

andel(andi(truei,truei)) : nd

But andel(truei) : nd as well !?

Natural Deduction

- Key idea: Instead of defining a type of proofs, define a *family* of types:

`nd : o -> type.`

- For any proposition p , the type `nd p` will be the type of proofs of p .
 - e.g., `nd(even(zero))` and `nd(even(succ(zero)))`

Natural Deduction

$\frac{}{\text{true}}$	$\frac{p \quad q}{p \wedge q}$	$\frac{p \wedge q}{p}$	$\frac{p \wedge q}{q}$
------------------------	--------------------------------	------------------------	------------------------

```
nd : o -> type.
truei : nd(true).
andi  : nd(A) -> nd(B) -> nd(and A B).
andel : nd(and A B) -> nd(A).
ander : nd(and A B) -> nd(B).
```

`andel(andi(truei,truei)) : nd(true)`

`andel(true)` is no-longer well-typed!

Natural Deduction: Quantifiers

$\frac{\forall x.p}{p[x \rightarrow c]}$	$\ulcorner \forall x.p \urcorner = \text{forall}(\lambda x:i.\ulcorner p \urcorner)$
	$\ulcorner p[x \rightarrow c] \urcorner = \ulcorner p \urcorner[x \rightarrow \ulcorner c \urcorner]$
	$\leftrightarrow_{\beta} (\lambda x.\ulcorner p \urcorner)\ulcorner c \urcorner$

`forall : nd(forall F) -> C:i -> nd(F C)`

$\frac{D}{\forall x.\text{even}(x)}$	$\ulcorner D \urcorner : \text{nd}(\text{forall}(\lambda x:i.\text{even}(x)))$
<code>even(1)</code>	<code>forall $\ulcorner D \urcorner$ (succ zero) : nd (even (succ zero))</code>

Applying LF to PL Theory

- Object Language

```
exp : type
Zero : exp
Succ : exp -> exp
Pair : exp -> exp -> exp
Fst  : exp -> exp
Fn   : (exp -> exp) -> exp
App  : exp -> exp -> exp
```

$\ulcorner \text{fn } x \Rightarrow (x, 0) \urcorner = \text{Fn}(\lambda x:\text{exp}.\text{Pair}(x,\text{Zero})) : \text{exp}$

Applying LF to PL Theory

- Value-ness

```

value : exp -> type.

val_z   : value Zero.
val_s   : value A -> value (Succ A).
val_pair : value A -> value B -> value (Pair A B).
    
```

$$\frac{}{0 \text{ value}} \quad \frac{v \text{ value}}{\text{Succ}(v) \text{ value}} \quad \frac{v1 \text{ value} \quad v2 \text{ value}}{(v1, v2) \text{ value}}$$

Applying LF to PL Theory

- Evaluation Rules

```

eval : exp -> exp -> type.

eval_z : eval Zero Zero.
eval_s : eval A B -> eval (Succ A) (Succ B).
eval_pair : eval A A' -> eval B B' ->
              eval (Pair A B) (Pair A' B').
    
```

$$\frac{}{0 \Downarrow 0} \quad \frac{e \Downarrow v}{\text{Succ}(e) \Downarrow \text{Succ}(v)} \quad \frac{e1 \Downarrow v1 \quad e2 \Downarrow v2}{(e1, e2) \Downarrow (v1, v2)}$$

Summary

- Logical frameworks like LF permit:
 - Specification of object languages
 - Specification of axioms and inference rules
 - Specification of meta-theorems (not shown)
 - Automatic checking of proofs.
- Key observations:
 - Proofs become terms in LF, a very small language.
 - Proof validity-checking performed by *typechecking* the corresponding LF.
 - LF typechecking is decidable.
 - An LF typechecker is very simple to implement.

Code Safety

- Given a piece of code that somebody else wrote, how do you know whether it's safe to run?
- Here safety can have a variety of meanings, depending on context, such as:
 - Won't crash
 - Won't cause other programs to crash
 - Won't consume too many resources
 - Won't access private data
 - Won't publicize private data
 - Won't erase your hard drive
- Given an arbitrary binary executable, determining safety is invariably an undecidable problem.

Example Application

- Networking
 - Operating system receives many network packets
 - Expensive to notify a processes for each packet
 - Most processes are not interested in all packets
- Packet filters:
 - Programmer-supplied code that scans a packet and decides whether it's of interest or not.
 - Typically runs in the kernel to avoid context-switches
 - Usually allowed to read from packet, and read/write small area of scratch memory.
 - Must not do arbitrary reads/writes to kernel memory.
 - Must execute quickly (in particular, no infinite loops).
 - Given a packet filter, how can the kernel decide if it is trustworthy?

Sandboxing

- Run-time checks
 - OS Protection: Give program its own "virtual machine"
 - Virtual memory, etc., restricts program accesses
 - Software Fault Isolation: Rewrite binary executables
 - Inserting check any time something bad might happen.
- Example: memory accesses
 - Packet filter is supposed to only read and write a certain set of memory addresses (packet + small scratch memory)
 - SFI: before every load or store instruction, check the address being accessed and abort if it's out of range
- Run-time overhead can be large.

Cryptography

- Don't run a program unless it is digitally signed by somebody you trust.
 - E.g., Microsoft.
- May protect against malicious code, but not against accidental errors.
 - Guarantees you know who to blame (or who to sue) if the program goes wrong.

Safe Languages

- The type systems of languages like SML, Modula 3, and Java guarantee certain safety properties for well-typed programs.
 - So, only run programs given in SML source, or Java bytecode, etc.
- Interpreters are slow
 - BSD packet filters use an in-kernel interpreter for a very simple, safe specialized language.
- Compilers are large, complicated programs.
 - Do you trust your SML or Java compiler to be bug-free?

Proof-Carrying Code

- Binary executables are packaged with proof of safety.
 - To see whether the code is trustworthy, just check the proof
 - No invalid steps
 - The proof must be a safety proof for this particular binary
 - Proof-checking is much easier than finding a proof from scratch!
- Advantages:
 - No run-time overhead
 - Very small "trusted computing base"
 - Just the code related to proof-checking
 - Immune to both accidental and malicious errors.

Example: PCC Packet Filters

- Necula and Lee [OSDI 1996]
 - Hand-coded sample packet filters (for speed).
 - Safety proofs generated automatically with a simple theorem prover.
 - Safety proofs encoded as an LF term (!)
 - Compact and easy to validate
 - Kernel just needs an LF typechecker (around 5 pages of C code)
 - Results: by definition, lowest per-packet overhead
 - 5-8x faster than BPF interpreter, 5x faster than Modula-3, 15-25% faster than SFI.
 - Proof-checking overhead at beginning very quickly amortized.

Proof-Carrying Code

- Where do proofs come from?
 - Manual
 - Whoever generates the binary also does some theorem proving
 - Certifying compilers
 - Compilers which automatically generate safety certificate.
 - Easiest if the source language already guarantees safety.
 - Note 1: If the compiler cannot prove safety (i.e., that a particular array access is always in bounds), it always has the alternative of inserting a run-time check that makes its job easier.
 - Note 2: there is no requirement that the compiler be bug-free!

PCC Packet Filters

- What exactly does safety mean here?
 - Every read is from the packet or scratch memory
 - Every write is to scratch memory
 - All branches are forward
 - Certain reserved registers are not modified.
- What can we assume when code starts running?

```
r1 mod 232 = r1
^ r2 mod 232 = r2 ^ r2 ≥ 64 ^
^ r3 mod 232 = r3 ^
^ ∀i.(i ≥ 0 ^ i < r2 ^ (i & 7) = 0) ⇒ readable(r1+i)
^ ∀j.(j ≥ 0 ^ j < 16 ^ (i & 7) = 0) ⇒ (readable(r3+j)
^ writable(r3+j))
^ ∀i,j.(i ≥ 0 ^ i < r2 ^ j ≥ 0 ^ j < 16) ⇒ (r1+i) ≠ (r3+j)
```