



Predicate Logic

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Predicate Calculus Language

- E is the start symbol
 - $E ::= A$ | // Atom (atomic formula)
 - $\neg E$ | // Negation (not)
 - $E \wedge E$ | // Conjunction (and)
 - $E \vee E$ | // Disjunction (or)
 - $E \rightarrow E$ | // Implication (implies)
 - $E \leftrightarrow E$ | // If-and-only-if
 - \perp | // Bottom
 - $\forall E$ | // Universally-quantified formula
 - $\exists E$ | // Existentially-quantified formula
-
- Precedence, tightest first: $\forall \exists \neg \wedge \vee \rightarrow \leftrightarrow$
 - Atom (A) now requires a more complex production



Atomic Formulas

- $A ::= P(L)$ // Predicate applied to list of terms
- $L ::= T \mid T \text{ ', ' } L$ // List of terms
- $T ::= V \mid C \mid F(L)$ // Term

- $V ::= \text{'x'} \mid \text{'y'} \mid \text{'z'} \mid \dots$ // Variable symbols
- $P ::= \text{'p'} \mid \text{'q'} \mid \text{'r'} \mid \dots$ // Predicate symbols
- $C ::= \text{'a'} \mid \text{'q'} \mid \text{'c'} \mid \dots$ // Constant symbols
- $F ::= \text{'f'} \mid \text{'g'} \mid \text{'h'} \mid \dots$ // Function symbols

Some predicates and functions may be abbreviated in infix form, e.g.

$= < < \dots$ will be infix predicate symbols

$+ * / \dots$ will be infix function symbols

We will not bother with a special grammar for these, although it can be done.



Arities

- In addition, predicate and function symbols have an “arity” (number of arguments) which we don’t show explicitly.
- Most of the time, we will not overload the symbols, but rather assume a fixed arity for a given symbol.
- So we will not typically use both $f(a, b)$ (2-ary) and $f(a)$ (1-ary), for example, in the same discussion.



Examples of Terms

- b constant
- y variable
- $f(b, y)$ function applications
- $g(h(b), c, h(y))$
- $g(a, b, g(a, b, c))$



Examples of Atomic Formulas

- $p(b)$
- $q(y)$
- $p(f(b, y))$
- $r(a, g(h(b), c, h(y)))$



Examples of “Literals”

- A **literal** is an atomic formula, or the negation of one.
 - $p(b)$
 - $\neg q(y)$
 - $\neg p(f(b, y))$
 - $r(a, g(h(b), c, h(y)))$
- Literals become important in resolution theorem proving.



Examples of Quantifier-Free Formulas

- $p(b) \vee p(c)$
- $p(y) \wedge q(y)$
- $p(f(b, y)) \rightarrow q(y)$
- $\neg r(a, g(h(b), c, h(y)))$



Examples of Formulas

- $\exists x p(x)$
- $\forall y (p(y) \wedge q(y))$
- $\forall y \exists x (p(f(x, y)) \rightarrow q(y))$
- $\forall x (p(f(x, y)) \vee q(x))$

- (Quantifier-free formulas are also formulas.)



Preview of Semantics

- We will give details of semantics later on. However, a preview is helpful to understand certain syntactic considerations.
- Predicate logic describes characteristics of particular kinds of structures, such as sets with certain algebraic properties.



Example:

Interpretation for the natural numbers

- The intended domain is $\{0, 1, 2, 3, \dots\}$.
- There is a constant symbol 0.
- There is a 1-ary function s (successor).
Informally, $s(n) = n+1$.
- There is a 2-ary predicate $=$ (equals).



Some formulas for this interpretation

- $\forall n \neg (s(n) = 0)$

[0 is not the successor of anything.]

- $\forall m (\neg (m = 0) \rightarrow (\exists n) (m = s(n)))$

[Anything other than 0 is the successor of something.]

- $\forall m \forall n ((s(m) = s(n)) \rightarrow m = n)$

[Successor is one-to-one.]



Example:

Interpretations for “Groups”

- The domain is non-empty (as always).
- The domain can be finite or infinite.
- There is a constant symbol u (unit).
- There is a 2-ary function f (group multiplication).
- There is a 2-ary predicate $=$ (equals).




Some formulas for groups

- $\forall x f(u, x) = x$
[u is an identity]
- $\forall x \forall y \forall z f(x, f(y, z)) = f(f(x, y), z)$
[f is associative]
- $\forall x \exists y f(x, y) = u$
[existence of inverse]

Examples of Groups


- Trivial group: $\{0\}$ $u = 0, f(0, 0) = 0$
- 2-element group: $\{0, 1\}$ $u = 0, f(x, y) = x + y \pmod{2}$
- p -element group: $\{0, 1, \dots, p-1\}$ for any prime p ,
 $u = 0, f(x, y) = x + y \pmod{p}$
- Rubik's cube twists
- Particle spins (physics)
- Tire rotations
- Many others




43252003274489856000 positions

Syntax Trees (or “Parse” Trees)


- We are assuming familiarity with syntax trees from CS 60.
- $\forall x, \exists x$ are treated as if **1-ary operators**.
- Example: $\forall x ((\exists y p(g(x, y))) \vee q(x))$




Free and Bound Variable Instances




Free and Bound Variable Instances



Free and Bound Variable Instances



Free and Bound Variable Instances





Scope of Variables

- The same variable may be used more than once in a formula, with different “meanings”.
- The idea of **scope** clarifies these separate meanings.
- For a formula $\forall x E$, or $\exists x E$, the scope of x extends only inside E , and not beyond.



Scope Defined Inductively

- For a quantifier-free formula, the scope of each variable is the entire formula.
- For $\forall x E$, or $\exists x E$, the scope of x is inside E , but not inside any quantification of the same variable inside E .
- Example: Two distinct scopes of x :


$$\forall x (p(x) \vee \exists x (q(x) \wedge r(x)) \vee s(x, y))$$





Renaming Variables

- It is better to avoid using the same variable for more than one scope.
- Bound variables can be renamed to a fresh variable to accomplish this.
- Example: One of the x's renamed to u:
$$\forall x (p(x) \vee \exists u (q(u) \wedge r(u)) \vee s(x, y))$$





Definition of Free and Bound Instances

- In a term, every instance of a variable is free.
- If φ is a formula, then any free instances of a variable x become bound in $\forall x \varphi$ and $\exists x \varphi$.
- The free instances of variables in φ and ψ remain free in $(\neg\varphi)$, $(\varphi \vee \psi)$, $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$, and $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$.
- The bound instances of variables in φ and ψ remain bound in $(\neg\varphi)$, $(\varphi \vee \psi)$, $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$, and $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi)$.




Substitutability Restriction

- We are going to need to be able to **substitute terms** for **free variables** in various formulas.
- While this is easy syntactically, there is a semantic restriction that must be observed:
 - In substituting a term for a variable within a formula, **no variables *within* the term can become bound** as a result of the substitution.
- If t is a term, v is a variable, and F is a formula, and the above restriction applies, we say that


“ t is free to replace v in F ”
(or more conventionally, **“ t is free for v in F ”**)

Non-Substitutability Example




$f(x)$ is **not** free to replace y in $\forall x (p(g(x, y)) \vee q(x))$

Non-Substitutability Example




Substitutability Example



$f(y)$ **is** free to replace y in $\forall x (p(g(x, y)) \vee q(x))$

Substitutability Example



$$\forall x (p(g(x, \mathbf{f(y)})) \vee q(x))$$



Substitution Notation

- If t is a term, v is a variable, and F is a formula, and

t is free to replace v in F

then by

$F[t/v]$

we mean the result of substituting t for every **free** occurrence of v in F .

This notation and substitution itself are to be used **only** when the substitutability restriction applies.

Note: $[/]$ is **meta**-syntax; these symbols do not appear in the resulting formula.



Substitution Notation Example

Let F be the formula

$$\forall x (p(g(x, y)) \vee q(x))$$

Let v be the variable y .

Let t be the term $f(y)$.

$f(y)$ **is** free to replace y in F .

$$F[f(y)/y] \text{ is } \forall x (p(g(x, f(y))) \vee q(x)).$$



Substitution Notation Example

Let F be the formula

$$\forall x (p(g(x, y)) \vee q(x))$$

Let v be the variable x .

Let t be the term $f(y)$.

$f(y)$ **is** free to replace x in F ;
there are no free instances of x .

$F[f(y)/y]$ is the same as F ;
there are no instances of y in F .



Syntax vs. Semantics

- Predicate logic proofs, in a system such as natural deduction, focus on **syntax**: each formula in the derivation is **mechanically-checkable** to be derivable from earlier formulas using only the given rules.
- The **semantics** or **meaning** of a formula is determined by separate considerations. Each formula is making a statement about some kind of **underlying structure**.



Purpose of Separating Syntax and Semantics

- Reasoning about semantics is often very complex.
- Logical syntax allows reasoning without revisiting semantic details at every step.



Interpretations of Formulas

- The structure(s) of interest in specific derivations are generally **not totally specified** in the system of derivation itself.
- Instead, we rely on certain formulas (“axioms”) to **characterize** the properties of these structures that are of interest. In natural deduction, these formulas will appear on the left-hand side of a sequent.
- It can then be proved separately that the syntactic rules are in agreement with the semantics of the intended **interpretation**.



Interpretation $I = (\Delta, \mu)$

- An **interpretation** for a set of terms and formulas consists of:
 - A (non-empty) **domain** Δ : that contains all individuals of interest.
 - For each **constant symbol** c , an element $\mu(c) \in \Delta$.
 - For each **function symbol** f , a function $\mu(f): \Delta^n \rightarrow \Delta$.
 - For each **predicate symbol** p , a function $\mu(p): \Delta^n \rightarrow \{T, F\}$.
 - For each **variable symbol** x , an element $\mu(x) \in \Delta$.
- Δ may also be called the “universe”.



The value of **terms** under an interpretation

- An interpretation $I = (\Delta, \mu)$ determines a value $I[t] \in \Delta$ of each term recursively:
 - If t is a constant symbol c , then $I[t] = \mu(c)$.
 - If t is a variable symbol v , then $I[t] = \mu(v)$.
 - If t is $f(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n)$ where the t_i are terms, then
$$I[t] = \mu(f)(I[t_1], I[t_2], \dots, I[t_n]).$$
- Notation: Stuff inside [...] is *syntactic*, not an expression in the meta-language. So it is not pre-evaluated as if a function.



Notation: $I[d/x]$

- If $I = (\Delta, \mu)$ is an interpretation, and x is a variable symbol, then by $I_{[d/x]}$, we mean the interpretation (Δ, μ') that is

identical to I , *except* that

$$\mu'(x) = d.$$



The value of **formulas** under an interpretation

- An interpretation $I = (\Delta, \mu)$ determines a value $I[t] \in \{T, F\}$ of each formula E recursively:
 - If E is an atomic formula $p(t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n)$, where p is a predicate symbol, and the t_i are terms, then
$$I[E] = \mu(p)(I[t_1], I[t_2], \dots, I[t_n]) \text{ [using the interpretation of terms]}$$
 - If E is $E_1 \circ E_2$, then $I[E] = I[E_1] \circ I[E_2]$ where \circ is one of $\wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \leftrightarrow$
 - If E is $\neg E_1$, then $I[E] = \neg I[E_1]$
 - If E is $\forall x E_1$, then $I[E]$ is T if $I_{[d/x]}[E_1] = T$ for *every* d in Δ .
 - If E is $\exists x E_1$, then $I[E]$ is T if $I_{[d/x]}[E_1] = T$ for *some* d in Δ .



Example

- Formula E is: $q(f(f(x)), c)$
- An interpretation I is
 - $\Delta = \{0, 1, 2\}$
 - $\mu(c) = 0$
 - $\mu(f) = \{0 \rightarrow 1, 1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 0\}$
 - $\mu(q) = \{(0, 2), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$
the set of pairs for which $\mu(q)$ is T
 - $\mu(x) = 2$
- Thus:
 - $I[f(f(x))] = \mu(f)(I[f(x)]) = \mu(f)(\mu(f)(I[x])) = \mu(f)(\mu(f)(\mu(x))) = 1$
 - $I(q(f(f(x)), c)) = \mu(q)(I[f(f(x))], \mu(c)) = \mu(q)(1, 0) = T$



Example

- Formula E is: $q(f(f(x)), c)$
- An interpretation I is
 - $\Delta = \{0, 1, 2\}$
 - $\mu(c) = 0$
 - $\mu(f) = \{0 \rightarrow 1, 1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 0\}$
 - $\mu(q) = \{(0, 2), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$
the set of pairs for which $\mu(q)$ is T
 - $\mu(x) = 0$ <<< changed
- Thus:
 - $I[f(f(x))] = \mu(f)(I[f(x)]) = \mu(f)(\mu(f)(I[x])) = \mu(f)(\mu(f)(\mu(x))) = 2$
 - $I(q(f(f(x)), c)) = \mu(q)(I[f(f(x))], \mu(c)) = \mu(q)(2, 0) = F$ <<< note



Example

- Formula E is: $\exists x q(f(f(x)), c)$
- An interpretation I is
 - $\Delta = \{0, 1, 2\}$
 - $\mu(c) = 0$
 - $\mu(f) = \{0 \rightarrow 1, 1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 0\}$
 - $\mu(q) = \{(0, 2), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$
the set of pairs for which $\mu(q)$ is T
- Thus:
 - $I[\exists x q(f(f(x)), c)] = T$ iff for *some* d in Δ , $I_{[d/x]}[q(f(f(x)), c)]$
 - We saw two slides ago that there is such a d, namely $d = 2$.
 - So $I[\exists x q(f(f(x)), c)] = T$.



Example

- Formula E is: $\forall x q(f(f(x)), c)$
- An interpretation I is
 - $\Delta = \{0, 1, 2\}$
 - $\mu(c) = 0$
 - $\mu(f) = \{0 \rightarrow 1, 1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 0\}$
 - $\mu(q) = \{(0, 2), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$
the set of pairs for which $\mu(q)$ is T
- Thus:
 - $I[\forall x q(f(f(x)), c)] = T$ iff for *all* d in Δ , $I_{[d/x]}[q(f(f(x)), c)] = T$.
 - We saw two slides ago that there is a d, namely 0, such that $I_{[d/x]}[q(f(f(x)), c)] = F$.
 - So $I[\forall x q(f(f(x)), c)] = F$.

New Example

- Formula is: $\forall x (q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c))$
- An interpretation I is
 - $\Delta = \{0, 1, 2\}$
 - $\mu(c) = 0$
 - $\mu(f) = \{0 \rightarrow 1, 1 \rightarrow 2, 2 \rightarrow 0\}$
 - $\mu(q) = \{(0, 2), (1, 0), (2, 1)\}$
the set of pairs for which $\mu(q)$ is T
- Thus:
 $I[\forall x (q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c))] = T$ iff for *all* d in Δ ,
 $I_{[d/x]}[q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c)] = T$.
 - We can check for each d whether or not this is true:
 - $d = 0$: $I_{[0/x]}[q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c)] = T$
 - $d = 1$: $I_{[1/x]}[q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c)] = F$
 - $d = 2$: $I_{[2/x]}[q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c)] = T$
- So $I[\forall x (q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c))] = F$
(but $I[\exists x (q(x, c) \rightarrow q(f(x), c))] = T$)



Satisfaction

- An interpretation I **satisfies** a formula E iff $I[E] = T$. We also say that E **is valid under** I. We also say that I is a **model** for E.
- A formula is **satisfiable** iff there is an interpretation that satisfies it, otherwise it is **unsatisfiable**.



Formalizing Semantic Entailment \models

- When $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n, \psi$ are predicate calculus formulas,

$$\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n \models \psi$$

means:

Every interpretation I that satisfies each of the formulas $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_n$ also satisfies ψ .

- $\Gamma \models \psi$, where Γ is a **set** of formulas, can be restated, by extending model to mean an interpretation satisfies the entire set, as:

Every model for Γ is also a model for ψ .



Validity

- When the left-hand side is empty:

$$\models \psi$$

we say that is **universally valid**,
or just plain **valid**.

- In this case, every relevant interpretation is a model.



\models in predicate calculus vs. propositional

- The predicate version of $\models \psi$ is a **very broad** statement:
 - The set of applicable structures is generally infinite.
 - If a given domain is infinite, so is the set of assignments.
- Intuitively there is much less likely to be an algorithm to check whether $\models \psi$ for predicate calculus in the way there is for the propositional calculus.



Examples of Valid and Invalid Formulas



Invalid Formulas Valid Under Specific Interpretations

-



Showing a Formula Invalid

- Find a **counterexample**: an interpretation under which the formula is not valid.
- **Example:** $\forall x (A(x) \rightarrow B(x)) \rightarrow (\exists x A(x) \rightarrow \forall x B(x))$
- Interpretation:
 - $\Delta = \{1, 2\}$
 - $\mu(A) = \{2\}$
 - $\mu(B) = \{2\}$



Predicate Calculus “with Equality”

- There is one exception to the “all interpretations” definitions of validity when the = predicate symbol is being used:
 - **Equality is always interpreted as identity.**



Equality Axioms

- Four types of axioms characterize equality:
 - $\forall x (x = x)$
 - $\forall x \forall y (x = y \rightarrow y = x)$
 - $\forall x \forall y \forall z ((x = y \wedge y = z) \rightarrow (x = z))$
 - $\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n \forall y_1 \dots \forall y_n$
 $(x_1 = y_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_n = y_n) \rightarrow (f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = f(y_1, \dots, y_n))$
where f is any n -ary function symbol
 - $\forall x_1 \dots \forall x_n \forall y_1 \dots \forall y_n$
 $(x_1 = y_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_n = y_n) \rightarrow (p(x_1, \dots, x_n) \rightarrow p(y_1, \dots, y_n))$
where p is any n -ary predicate symbol

ND Equality Rules

- Natural Deduction typically introduces rules for equality (from which the axioms can be derived).
 - $\frac{}{t = t}$ where t is any term =I
 - $\frac{s = t \quad \varphi[s/x]}{\varphi[t/x]}$ where s and t are any terms =E
(s and t must be free to replace x in φ)



Soundness and Completeness

- As with propositional logic, we define:
- **Soundness** of a set of derivation rules:

For any set of formulas Γ and any formula ψ :
 $\Gamma \vdash \psi$ implies $\Gamma \models \psi$

- **Completeness** of a set of derivation rules:

For any set of formulas Γ and any formula ψ :
 $\Gamma \models \psi$ implies $\Gamma \vdash \psi$



Natural Deduction Rules

- We need introduction and elimination rules for both:
 - \forall
 - \exists
- These will be added to our propositional natural deduction rules.



\forall -Elimination Rule $\forall E$

- $$\frac{\forall x \varphi}{\varphi[t/x]} \quad \forall E$$

where t is any term that is free to replace x in φ .

- What the rule says:**

If we have derived a universally-quantified formula φ , then the formula φ with any (appropriately-qualified) **specific instance** of x substituted for x is also derivable.



Why the Substitution Qualification is Necessary

- $$\frac{\forall x \varphi}{\varphi[t/x]} \quad (\forall E)$$

where t is any term that is free to replace x in φ .

- Correct example: z is free to replace x in $\exists y p(y, x)$
 1. $\forall x \exists y p(y, x)$ Premise
 2. $\exists y p(y, z)$ $\forall E$ 1 (substituting **z** for x)
- Incorrect example: y is **not** free to replace x in $\exists y p(y, x)$
 1. $\forall x \exists y p(y, x)$ Premise
 2. $\exists y p(y, y)$ $\forall E$ 1 (substituting **y** for x)
- For instance, p could be $>$ in the domain of natural numbers.

\forall -Introduction Rule ($\forall I$)

- This rule uses a sub-derivation, with **no formula assumed**, but with a **fresh variable** introduced.

$$\boxed{\begin{array}{c} x_0 \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \varphi[x_0/x] \end{array}}$$

($\forall I$)

$$\frac{}{\forall x \varphi}$$

- x_0 is a “fresh” variable otherwise unused in the proof.
- x_0 must be free to replace x in φ , but since x_0 is “fresh”, this should never be an issue; It can’t become bound.



\forall -Introduction Rule

- **What this rule says:**
- If we have argued to derive a term $\varphi[x_0/x]$ where x_0 is an **arbitrary** value of x , then we are justified in concluding $\forall x \varphi$.
- The key is the word “arbitrary”; there can be no constraints attached to x_0 .
- Note: Once the conclusion $\forall x \varphi$ is drawn, x_0 is **discharged** and cannot be further used.

$\forall E \ \forall I$ Example

- Derive $\forall x p(x) \vdash \forall y p(y)$:

1.	$\forall x p(x)$	Premise
2.	x_0	Fresh var
3.	$p(x_0)$	$\forall E$ 1
4.	$\forall y p(y)$	$\forall I$ 2-3

$\forall E$ $\forall I$ Example

- Derive $\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \forall x p(x) \vdash \forall x q(x)$:

1.	$\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x))$	Premise
2.	$\forall x p(x)$	Premise
3.	x_0	Fresh var
4.	$p(x_0) \rightarrow q(x_0)$	$\forall E$ 1
5.	$p(x_0)$	$\forall E$ 2
6.	$q(x_0)$	$\rightarrow E$ 4, 5
7.	$\forall x q(x)$	$\forall I$ 3-6



$\forall E$ $\forall I$ English Equivalent

- Derive $\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \forall x p(x) \vdash \forall x q(x)$:
- Assume $\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x))$ and $\forall x p(x)$.

Let x_0 be an arbitrary element.

From the the first assumption $p(x_0) \rightarrow q(x_0)$, and from the second $p(x_0)$, hence also $q(x_0)$ by *modus ponens*.

Since x_0 was chosen arbitrarily, $q(x_0)$ gives us $\forall x q(x)$.



$\forall E$ $\forall I$ Example

- Derive $\forall x \forall y p(x, y) \vdash \forall y \forall x p(x, y)$:
 1. $\forall x \forall y p(x, y)$ Premise
 - 2.

Where $\forall I$ is to be used, work backward.

$\forall E \forall I$ Example

- Derive $\forall x \forall y p(x, y) \vdash \forall y \forall x p(x, y)$:

1.	$\forall x \forall y p(x, y)$	Premise
2.	y_0	Fresh
3.	x_0	Fresh
4.	$\forall y p(x_0, y)$	$\forall E$ 1
5.	$p(x_0, y_0)$	$\forall E$ 4
6.	$\forall x p(x, y_0)$	$\forall I$ 3-5
7.	$\forall y \forall x p(x, y)$	$\forall I$ 2-6



\exists -Introduction Rule ($\exists I$)

- $$\frac{\varphi[t/x]}{\exists x \varphi} \quad (\exists I)$$

where t is any term that is free to replace x in φ .

- **What the rule says:**

If we have exhibited a formula φ in which variable x is replaced by a **specific instance** then we can conclude that there is **an** x for which the formula is true.



\exists -Introduction Rule ($\exists I$)

- $$\frac{\varphi[t/x]}{\exists x \varphi} \exists I$$

where t is any term that is free to replace x in φ .

- In essence, this rule **loses information**, by replacing knowledge of a **specific** x for which is true with the statement that there is some such x .
- It is analogous to rule \forall -Introduction.



Why lose information?

- For one thing, the specific term t derived might not be “exportable”;

it could depend on some fresh variable introduced inside the box.



$\forall E \exists I$ Example


- Derive $\forall x p(x) \vdash \exists x p(x)$:

1.	$\forall x p(x)$	Premise
2.	$p(x)$	$\forall E$ 1
3.	$\exists x p(x)$	$\exists I$ 2

Note: x is free to replace x in $p(x)$, since nothing is bound in $p(x)$.


Note: Here is one place we rely on the semantic domain being **non-empty**.

\exists -Elimination Rule ($\exists E$)



- Here x_0 is a “fresh” variable otherwise unused in the proof.
- x_0 must be free to replace x in φ , but since x_0 is “fresh”, this should never be an issue.

\exists -Elimination Rule ($\exists x E$)



- **What this rule says:**
- Assume that we have derived $\exists x \varphi$. One use we can make of this fact is to let x_0 be **an** x such that $\varphi[x_0/x]$. There can be no other constraints on x_0 . If we then derive χ from the assumption about φ , then we can conclude χ in general.

\exists I \exists E Example

- Derive $\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \exists x p(x) \vdash \exists x q(x)$:

1.	$\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x))$	Premise
2.	$\exists x p(x)$	Premise
3.	x_0	Fresh var, Assumption
4.	$p(x_0)$	$\forall E$ 1
5.	$p(x_0) \rightarrow q(x_0)$	$\rightarrow e$ 3, 4
6.	$q(x_0)$	$\exists I$ 5
7.	$(\exists x) q(x)$	$\exists E$ 2, 3-6

- In the $\exists E$ rule, φ is identified with $p(x)$, while χ is identified with $\exists x q(x)$.
- Try not to be confused by the fact that \exists is in the conclusion. The \exists in 2 is what was eliminated.



$\exists I$ $\exists E$ Example in English

- Derive $\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \exists x p(x) \vdash \exists x q(x)$:
- Assume $\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x))$ and $\exists x p(x)$.

Let x_0 be such that $p(x_0)$.

By the first assumption, $p(x_0) \rightarrow q(x_0)$.
Hence $q(x_0)$ by modus ponens.

Since we've exhibited an x such that $q(x)$,
conclude $\exists x q(x)$.



\exists I \exists E **Incorrect** Proof Example

- Derive $\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x)), \exists x p(x) \vdash \exists x q(x)$:

1.	$\forall x (p(x) \rightarrow q(x))$	Premise
2.	$\exists x p(x)$	Premise
3.	x_0 $p(x_0)$	Fresh var, Assumption
4.	$p(x_0) \rightarrow q(x_0)$	$\forall E$ 1
5.	$q(x_0)$	$\rightarrow E$ 3, 4
6.	$q(x_0)$	$\exists E$ 3-5
7.	$(\exists x) q(x)$	$\exists I$ 6

- Formulas containing x_0 cannot be carried outside the box.
- The box for $\exists E$ has two purposes:
 - Restricting the scope of the introduced variable.
 - Restricting the scope of the assumption.



Caution: $\exists E$

- Normally, $\exists E$ can only be used to introduce a variable once. You cannot use it to introduce a second distinct variable.
- In other words, $\exists x\varphi$ says that **an** x exists, but not necessarily more than one.
- In contrast, you can use $\exists I$ as many times as you want (not that it will help).



Quantifier rule summary

	Introduction	Elimination
\forall	$\frac{x_0 \dots \varphi[x_0/x]}{\forall x \varphi}$	$\frac{\forall x \varphi}{\varphi[t/x]}$ (t is free to replace x)
	$\forall I$	$\forall E$
\exists	$\frac{\varphi[t/x]}{\exists x \varphi}$ (t is free to replace x)	$\frac{\exists x \varphi \quad x_0 \varphi[x_0/x] \dots \chi}{\chi}$
	$\exists I$	$\exists E$

JAPE Examples


- **\forall Elimination** (working forward) instantiates a \forall -quantified variable with **a term that already exists** (in this case, i):

1:	$\forall x.R(x)$	premise
2:	i	assumption
3:	$R(i)$	\forall elim 1,2



JAPE Examples

- **\forall Introduction** (working backward) introduces a fresh variable.
The variable can't be taken outside the box.






JAPE Examples

- \forall Introduction (working backward), followed by \forall Elimination (working forward)

1: $\forall x.R(x)$ premise
2: actual i assumption
3: R(i) \forall elim 1,2
4: $\forall y.R(y)$ \forall intro 2-3

- Note: JAPE will *unify* the above premise and conclusion, so a *shorter* proof, using the 'hyp' rule is:

1: $\forall x.R(x)$ premise
...
2: $\forall y.R(y)$



1: $\forall x.R(x)$ premise



JAPE Examples

- **\exists Elimination** (working forward) introduces a fresh variable for a sub-proof.
- It *needs* a goal, in order to introduce the goal for the sub-proof.

1: $\exists y.R(y), \forall x.(R(x) \rightarrow S(x))$ premises

2: actual i , $R(i)$

assumptions

...

3: $\exists y.S(y)$

4: $\exists y.S(y)$

\exists elim 1.1,2-3



JAPE Examples

- **\exists Introduction** (working backward) needs a term that it can use as an instantiation for the \exists variable.
- The JAPE ND theory doesn't have functions yet, so all such terms will be variables.
- The variable must be identified by the user.

1: $\exists y.R(y), \forall x.(R(x) \rightarrow S(x))$ premises


2: actual i, R(i)
3: R(i) \rightarrow S(i)
4: S(i)
...
5: $\exists y.S(y)$

assumptions

\forall elim 1.2,2.1

\rightarrow elim 3,2.2

\exists elim 1.1,2-5



1: $\exists y.R(y), \forall x.(R(x) \rightarrow S(x))$ premises

2: actual i, R(i)
3: R(i) \rightarrow S(i)
4: S(i)
5: $\exists y.S(y)$

assumptions

\forall elim 1.2,2.1

\rightarrow elim 3,2.2

\exists intro 4,2.1

\exists elim 1.1,2-5



Sometimes the steps have to be taken in an unexpected order, e.g. $\exists E$ won't work forward

1: $\neg\exists x.\neg R(x)$ premise
...
2: $\forall y.R(y)$

1: $\neg\exists x.\neg R(x)$ premise
2: **actual i** assumption
...
3: **R(i)**
4: $\forall y.R(y)$ \forall intro 2-3

1: $\neg\exists x.\neg R(x)$ premise
2: **actual i** assumption
3: **$\neg R(i)$** assumption
...
4: **\perp**
5: **R(i)** contra (classical) 3-4
6: $\forall y.R(y)$ \forall intro 2-5

Why not $\exists I$ here?

1: $\neg\exists x.\neg R(x)$ premise
2: **actual i** assumption
3: **$\neg R(i)$** assumption
...
4: **$_B1$**
...
5: **\neg_B1**
6: **\perp** \neg elim 4,5
7: **R(i)** contra (classical) 3-6
8: $\forall y.R(y)$ \forall intro 2-7

unify step

1: $\neg\exists x.\neg R(x)$ premise
2: **actual i** assumption
3: **$\neg R(i)$** assumption
...
4: **$\exists x.\neg R(x)$**
5: **\perp** \neg elim 4,1
6: **R(i)** contra (classical) 3-5
7: $\forall y.R(y)$ \forall intro 2-6

1: $\neg\exists x.\neg R(x)$ premise
2: **actual i** assumption
3: **$\neg R(i)$** assumption
4: **$\exists x.\neg R(x)$** \exists intro 3,2
5: **\perp** \neg elim 4,1
6: **R(i)** contra (classical) 3-5
7: $\forall y.R(y)$ \forall intro 2-6



JAPE

- The non-empty universe is not assumed in JAPE!!
- If you need this, you must introduce a premise that there is at least one element, by including 'actual i' as a premise.
- Valid in textbooks, but not provable in JAPE:

1: $\forall x.R(x)$ premise

...

2: $\exists x.R(x)$

- Can't go backward, because $\exists I$ needs a term.
- Can't go forward, because $\forall E$ needs a variable.

\forall intro (introduces variable)

\exists intro (needs variable)

\forall elim (needs variable)

\exists elim (assumption & variable)



JAPE

- The non-empty universe is not assumed in JAPE.
- If you need this, you must introduce a premise that there is at least one element, by including 'actual i' as a premise.

1: actual i, $\forall x.R(x)$ premises	
2: $R(i)$	\forall elim 1.2,1.1
3: $\exists x.R(x)$	\exists intro 2,1.1

- See Bornat's book "Proof and Disproof ... " for discussion on why this philosophy is better.



A Tricky One

1: actual j, actual k premises

...

2: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$



A Tricky One

- 1: actual j, actual k premises
- ...
- 2: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$

Note: This does **not** say that j and k are distinct. They could be two names for the same individual.

- 1: actual j, actual k premises
- 2: $R(j) \vee \neg R(j)$ Theorem $E\vee\neg E$
- ...
- 3: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$

- 1: actual j, actual k premises
- 2: $_E\vee\neg_E$ Theorem $E\vee\neg E$
- ...
- 3: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$

- 1: actual j, actual k premises
- 2: $R(j) \vee \neg R(j)$ Theorem $E\vee\neg E$
- 3: $R(j)$ assumption
- ...
- 4: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$
- 5: $\neg R(j)$ assumption
- ...
- 6: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$
- 7: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$ \vee elim 2,3-4,5-6

What x would make this work?

What x would make this work?



A Tricky One

1: actual j, actual k premises
 2: $R(j) \vee \neg R(j)$ Theorem $E\vee\neg E$
 3: $R(j)$ assumption
 ...
 4: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$
 5: $\neg R(j)$ assumption
 ...
 6: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$
 7: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$ \vee elim 2,3-4,5-6

• • •

Note: This does **not** say that j and k are distinct. They could be two names for the same individual.

1: actual j, actual k premises
 2: $R(j) \vee \neg R(j)$ Theorem $E\vee\neg E$
 3: $R(j)$ assumption
 4: $R(k)$ assumption
 5: $R(j) \wedge R(k)$ \wedge intro 3,4
 6: $R(k) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k)$ \rightarrow intro 4-5
 7: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$ \exists intro 6,1.2
 8: $\neg R(j)$ assumption
 9: $R(j) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k)$ Theorem $\neg E \vdash E \rightarrow F$ 8
 0: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$ \exists intro 9,1.1
 1: $\exists x.(R(x) \rightarrow R(j) \wedge R(k))$ \vee elim 2,3-7,8-10



Syllogisms (WP)


- A **syllogism** consists of three parts: the major premise, the minor premise, and the conclusion. In Aristotle, each of the premises is in the form "Some/all A belong to B," where "Some/All A" is one term and "belong to B" is another, but more modern logicians allow some variation. Each of the premises has one term in common with the conclusion: in a major premise, this is the major term (i.e., the predicate) of the conclusion; in a minor premise, it is the minor term (the subject) of the conclusion. For example:
 - **Major premise:** All humans are mortal.
 - **Minor premise:** Socrates is a human.
 - **Conclusion:** Socrates is mortal.
- Each of the three distinct terms represents a category, in this example, "human," "mortal," and "Socrates." "Mortal" is the major term; "Socrates," the minor term. The **premises also have one term in common** with each other, which is known as the **middle term** — in this example, "human."

Note: Being a syllogism does not require validity.



Proving a Syllogism Using Venn Diagram

- All fruit is nutritious.
- Some fruit is tasty.
- Some tasty things are nutritious.





Codifying Syllogisms using Predicate Logic

- Use unary predicates.
 - $S(x)$: "x is an S", "x has an S", "x belongs to S", etc.
- Use quantifiers for some, all
 - $\forall \exists$
- Use connectives
 - $\neg \rightarrow$
- Use constant symbols for individuals



Translating a Syllogism

Statement	Translation
All humans are mortal.	$\forall x (H(x) \rightarrow M(x))$
Socrates is a human.	$H(s)$
Socrates is mortal.	$M(s)$

This syllogism happens to be valid.



Syllogistic Forms

Statement Form	Translation
All S is/are/has... P.	$\forall x (S(x) \rightarrow P(x))$
Some S is P.	$\exists x (S(x) \wedge P(x))$
No S is P.	$\neg \exists x (S(x) \wedge P(x))$
Some S is not P.	$\exists x (S(x) \wedge \neg P(x))$
No S is not P.	$\neg \exists x (S(x) \wedge \neg P(x))$
All S is not P.	$\forall x (S(x) \rightarrow \neg P(x))$

Are any forms equivalent to one another?



Example: Translate this syllogism,
then try to prove it.

- All fruit is nutritious.
- Some fruit is tasty.
- Some tasty things are nutritious.



Example: Translate this syllogism,
then try to prove it.

- No humans are perfect.
- All perfect creatures are mythical.
- Some mythical creatures are not human.



DeMorgan's Rules for Quantifiers

- Recall DeMorgan's rules for propositions

- $(p \wedge q) \leftrightarrow \neg(\neg p \vee \neg q)$

- $(\neg p \vee \neg q) \leftrightarrow \neg(p \wedge q)$

- $(p \vee q) \leftrightarrow \neg(\neg p \wedge \neg q)$

- $\neg(p \vee q) \leftrightarrow (\neg p \wedge \neg q)$

- For quantifiers, we have analogous rules

- $\forall x P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg(\exists x \neg P(x))$

- $\exists x \neg P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg \forall x P(x)$

- $\exists x P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg(\forall x \neg P(x))$

- $\neg \exists x P(x) \leftrightarrow \forall x \neg P(x)$

- Note that in some cases, only one direction of implication is constructive.

Constructive \rightarrow vs. Classical \leftarrow

1: $E \wedge F$	premise
2: $\neg E \vee \neg F$	assumption
3: $\neg E$	assumption
4: E	\wedge elim 1
5: \perp	\neg elim 4,3
6: $\neg F$	assumption
7: F	\wedge elim 1
8: \perp	\neg elim 7,6
9: \perp	\vee elim 2,3-5,6-8
10: $\neg(\neg E \vee \neg F)$	\neg intro 2-9


1: $\neg(\neg E \vee \neg F)$	premise
2: $\neg E$	assumption
3: $\neg E \vee \neg F$	\vee intro 2
4: \perp	\neg elim 3,1
5: E	contra (classical) 2-4
6: $\neg F$	assumption
7: $\neg E \vee \neg F$	\vee intro 6
8: \perp	\neg elim 7,1
9: F	contra (classical) 6-8
10: $E \wedge F$	\wedge intro 5,9

Constructive \rightarrow vs. Classical \leftarrow


1: $\forall x.R(x)$	premise
2: $\exists y. \neg R(y)$	assumption
3: actual i, $\neg R(i)$	assumptions
4: $R(i)$	\forall elim 1,3.1
5: \perp	\neg elim 4,3.2
6: \perp	\exists elim 2,3-5
7: $\neg \exists y. \neg R(y)$	\neg intro 2-6

1: $\neg \exists x. \neg R(x)$	premise
2: actual i	assumption
3: $\neg R(i)$	assumption
4: $\exists x. \neg R(x)$	\exists intro 3,2
5: \perp	\neg elim 4,1
6: $R(i)$	contra (classical) 3-5
7: $\forall y.R(y)$	\forall intro 2-6

Note Rule Parallels



Note Rule Parallels






Fun with Relations

- A 2-ary predicate represents a binary relation, i.e. a set of pairs of domain elements.
- Various properties of relations can be expressed using predicate logic formulas.
- In the following, what formula characterizes each relation represented by predicate L (sometimes using “loves” for analogy), and possibly the predicate $=$.


Everybody loves somebody.



$$\forall x \exists y L(x, y)$$




Everybody is loved by somebody.






Somebody loves everybody.

“Pollyanna”






Nobody loves everybody.






Nobody loves somebody.




Everybody loves everybody.



"Commune"




Everybody loves exactly one.






Nobody loves exactly one.






Everybody loves him/herself.

“Reflexive”






Everybody loves him/herself and only him/herself.







L is symmetric.



L is transitive.




L is an equivalence relation




Reflexive,
symmetric,
transitive



L is antisymmetric.




L is a partial order ("poset").



Reflexive,
Antisymmetric,
Transitive

L is a linear (or total) order.



A proof

- Suppose everyone loves somebody, and loves is symmetric and transitive.
- Then loves is reflexive.

1:	$\forall x. \exists y. R(x,y), \forall x. \forall y. (R(x,y) \rightarrow R(y,x))$	premises
2:	$\forall x. \forall y. \forall z. ((R(x,y) \wedge R(y,z)) \rightarrow R(x,z))$	premise
3:	actual i	assumption
4:	$\forall y. \forall z. ((R(i,y) \wedge R(y,z)) \rightarrow R(i,z))$	\forall elim 2,3
5:	$\forall y. (R(i,y) \rightarrow R(y,i))$	\forall elim 1.2,3
6:	$\exists y. R(i,y)$	\forall elim 1.1,3
7:	actual i1	assumption
8:	$R(i,i1)$	assumption
9:	$\forall z. ((R(i,i1) \wedge R(i1,z)) \rightarrow R(i,z))$	\forall elim 4,7
10:	$(R(i,i1) \wedge R(i1,i)) \rightarrow R(i,i)$	\forall elim 9,3
11:	$R(i,i1) \rightarrow R(i1,i)$	\forall elim 5,7
12:	$R(i1,i)$	\rightarrow elim 11,8
13:	$R(i,i1) \wedge R(i1,i)$	\wedge intro 8,12
14:	$R(i,i)$	\rightarrow elim 10,13
15:	$R(i,i)$	\exists elim 6,7-14
16:	$\forall x. R(x,x)$	\forall intro 3-15



How to do without function symbols

- Every n -ary function is an $(n+1)$ -ary relation.
- For example, a binary function f can be represented by a 3-ary relation F .
- $F(x, y, z)$ means $f(x, y) = z$.
- Functionality induces some additional axioms for F :
 - $\forall x \forall y \exists z F(x, y, z)$
 - $\forall x \forall y \forall z \forall z' (F(x, y, z) \wedge F(x, y, z') \rightarrow z = z')$
- We'd still need axioms for equality.



Example: Group theory (e is unit)

- $\forall x \forall y \exists z F(x, y, z)$
- $\forall x \forall y \forall z \forall z' (F(x, y, z) \wedge F(x, y, z') \rightarrow z = z')$
- $\forall x \forall y \forall z \exists v (F(x, y, v) \wedge F(v, z, w)) \rightarrow$
 $\exists u (F(y, z, u) \wedge F(x, u, w))$
- $\forall x F(x, e, x)$
- $\forall x F(e, x, x)$
- $\forall x \exists y F(x, y, e)$
- + Equality axioms

- It is a pain to do without function symbols!